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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
AGENCY: THE POWER OF AN INFANT TO APPOINT
AN AGENT IN MONTANA
By the almost uniform common law rule today' an infant
may appoint an agent to act for him just as can any other
person, subject only to his power of disaffirmance. Authorities
generally approve this rule.' R. C. M. 1935, Section 5678 casts
some doubt on the infant's power to appoint in Montana, how-
ever. It reads: "A minor cannot give a delegation of power."
It is submitted that this section, if harmonized properly with
other pertinent CODE sections, cannot deny an infant's power
to appoint.!
'It was often stated as a rule of early common law that an infant could
not appoint an agent. Actually it was an uncharted statement in a
huge body of dicta. In an attempt to rationally justify this supposed
rule it has been said that the ".,. . constituting of an attorney by one
whose acts were in their nature voidable, is repugnant and impossible,
for it is imparting a right which the principal does not possess, that of
doing valid acts." I Am. Lead. Cases, 224.
'"his reasoning is based upon the theory ... that an act of an
infant done through an agent must in any event be more binding than
if done by the infant in person; and that the assumption is that the
infant cannot do voidable acts through an agent as well as in person."
1 Macn m, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §141.
Such an argument is highly artificial and would appear unsound.
Stripped of all the trappings with which the law has clothed him, an
agent is a mere instrumentality through which another acts. When
used in the subject of agency, the word " . . .denotes usually one hu-
man being who is used by another as a means of accomplishing some
purpose of the latter." MEcnaM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
(3fd ed. 1923) 51. In all real agency questions where the principal is
bound, he is so only because the law finds that it was his act expressed
through the agent. The older authorities apparently felt that the tran-
saction between the principal and agent and the other with the third
party was an indivisible Siamese union. In truth they are not. While
the third party must establish the agency in order to bind the principal,
the facts raising the agency constitute a separate and distinct legal re-
lationship as between the principal and the agent.
Hastings v. Dollarhide (1864) 24 Cal. 195; Coursolle v. Weyerhauser
(1897) 69 Minn. 557, 72 N. W. 697; Casey v. Kastel (1924) 237 N. Y.
305, 143 N. E. 671, 31 A. L. R. 995, 1001 ; RSTAT5MIENT, AGENCY, §20; 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §227A.
a The tenor of two Montana decisions: Flaherty v. Butte Elec. Ry. (1910)
40 Mont. 454, 107 P. 406, 135 Am. St. Rep. 630; and Lazich v. Belanger
(1940) -Mont.-, 105 P. (2d) 738, would indicate that, under §5678,
an infant cannot appoint an agent for any object whatsoever. Both
cases involved the question as to whether the negligence of a parent, in
looking after the material and physical welfare of the child, could be
imputed to it. The court answered in the negative. The Belanger case
declared that, under the statute, ".... an infant is incapable of appoint-
ing an agent for any purpose." The use of the statute for such a pur-
pose is dangerous and misleading. In view of the facts, it Is equivalent
to saying that even a natural or legal guardian cannot do valid acts
in behalf of the child. Even if the court had held the infant responsi-
ble for the negligence of its parents, it could have done so either by
finding an agency by operation of law, attaching to it the ordinary con-
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NOTE AND COMMENT
Section 7929 of the CODE provides: "Any person having
the power to contract may appoint an agent ... ." Section
5679 states: "A minor may make a conveyance or other contract
in the same manner as any other person, subject only to his
power of disaffirmance. .... " If an infant has the power to
contract he necessarily comes under Section 7929, and therefore
has the power to appoint an agent. But at least one CoDE sec-
tion may be thought to deny his capacity to contract. Section
7469 states: "All persons are capable of contracting except a
minor, . . ." But the section' immediately following declares
that, "Minors . . .have only such capacity as is defined by
Sections 5673 to 5687 of this Code." It is submitted that the
CODE sections just referred to recognize a full capacity to con-
tract as that phrase is generally understood.'
As stated above, Section 5679 says that an infant has the
same contractual capacity as any other person, subject only to
his power of disaffirmance. A power of disaffirmance should
not be considered a limitation. Rather it is a privilege not
possessed by adults-a personal defense. An adult assignee of
a contract from an infant does not take the power to avoid, but
is bound as if he had made the contract himself: It is well set-
sequences of an agent's negligence; or, it is submitted, it could have
Justified its conclusions more correctly by treating it as an incident of
the parent-child relationship rather than of real agency, even though,
as to the infant's liability for loss of rights by the negligence of the
parent, it might be similar to that arising from an ordinary agency.
The Belanger case particularly, states other more ample and sound
grounds for giving the infant an immunity to the parent's negligence
than a supposed incapacity to appoint an agent.
'R. C. M. 1935, §7470.
"In the construction of a particular statute, all acts relating to the
same subject or having the same general purpose should be read in con-
nection with it, as together constituting one law, it being the duty of
the courts to reconcile them, if possible, and make them operative."
State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors (1924) 71 Mont. 79, 227 P. 427.
One should remember that all of the Code Sections discussed herein
were originally enacted at the same time, in 1895, as an integral part
of the FinD CoD. Hence it is impossible to apply the doctrine of "im-
plied repeal" by subsequent enactment to any of the Sections. And see
R. C. M. 1935, §10520, which, in brief, says that the particular should
be read over the generaL It would seem that the language of §5679
is much more explicit than that of §5678. Furthermore, it would seem
unlikely that the legislature would place inconsistent statutes in con-
secutive order.
'Riley v. Dillon (1906) 148 Ala. 283, 41 S. 768; Hill v. Weil (1918) 202
Ala. 400, 80 S. 536.
"The right of disaffirmance is confined to the infant himself or
his legal representatives ... heirs, or executives or administrators are
(such), and probably guardians also." 1 Wum~sTON, CoNrRA&cs (Rev. ed.
1936) §232 and cases cited. But see Levitt, The Interests Secured by
the Law Governing the Contracts of an Infant, 94 CuNT. L. J&- 4, 8
(1922).
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tled that a contract does not have to be mutually enforceable in
order to be a valid contract.' The power of an infant to en-
force must be held to arise out of an existing contract. Section
7929 therefore clearly seems to authorize an infant to appoint
an agent. If the meaning of Section 5678 were clear and free
from possible doubt, a reconciliation would be most difficult.
Such, however, is not the case. The following discussion as to
the meaning of the words "give", "delegation" and "power"
will indicate that they may reasonably be given other meanings
than those required if this section denies all capacity in an
infant to appoint an agent.'
The mere fact that the word "power" is not limited or
modified does not justify the conclusion that it is used neces-
sarily in a generic sense so as to include the capacity to appoint
an agent. It frequently is used in such universal terms even
though the writer is referring only to something in the nature of
a proprietary interest in land. Indeed, the only CODE section
in which it seems to be defined describes it as an authority in
relation to real property." Furthermore our CODE declares
that when a legal term is defined therein it has that meaning
throughout unless the contrary clearly appears.'
'1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §19.
'While no authority should be necessary for the proposition that an In-
fant too young to reason is Incapable of contracting, see 1 WLLISTON,
CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §227A, to that effect.
'In declaring that §5678 is ambiguous, this comment is not concerned in
establishing its "proper" construction. The fact that it is ambiguous,
however, simplifies the problem of harmonizing it with §7929. It
becomes unnecessary even to consider the maxim of construction set
forth in §10520: " . . . when a general and particular provision are in-
consistent, the latter is paramount to the former .... " Barth v. Ely
(1929) 85 Mont. 310, 278 P. 1002. Even if it were decided that §5678
were Inconsistent with §7929, the rule in §10520 would not help us,
however, because §5678 is specific as to the person, and general as to
the subject, while just the reverse is true in §7929. Then, the posi-
tion of our Court as stated In City of Butte et al. v. Industrial Ac-
cident Board of Montana et al. (1916) 52 Mont. 75, 78, 156 P. 130,
131, is significant in this connection: "In Stadler v. City of Helena,
46 Mont. 128, 127 P. 454, we said:
'Where there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and com-
prehensive terms and another dealing with a part of the same subject
in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together
and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consist-
ent legislative policy'."
'OR. C. M. 1935, §6788 defines 'power', under Chapter 63, as "... an au-
thority to do some act in relation to real property, or the creation or
revocation of any estate therein, or a charge thereon, which the owner
granting or reserving might himself perform for any purpose."
"R. C. M. 1935, §8776: "Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is
defined in any part of this code, such definition is applicable to the
same word or phrase wherever it occurs, except where a contrary in-
tent plainly appears."
3
Ettien: Agency: The Power of an Infant to Appoint an Agent in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1941
NOTE AND COMMENT
The word "delegation" likewise adds to our confusion. It
is used unqualifiedly in treatises on Agency to describe only
the question of the power of an agent to act through a sub-
agent." Though that may not seem its most likely meaning in
this section, at least the meaning is not clear on its face.
Again, the use of the word "give" raises some doubts as
to the meaning of this section. In its most characteristic use
it applies to a grant of power, donation or gift of property in-
terests, rather than any legal incident involved in the simple
appointment of an agent. Further these words used together
have no more certain meaning than when examined separately.
And finally, it may well be doubted whether the section con-
sidered as a whole means more than to affirm the generally
recognized rule that an infant cannot act so as to bind himself
irrevocably with reference to whatever acts are deemed to be
covered by the word "power."'
With these ambiguities present, it seems that Section 5678
should, if possible, be interpreted so as to harmonize with the
perfectly clear language of Section 7929. There seem to be no
other CODE sections militating against this conclusion." How-
ever, three cases annotated under the FiELD CoD2 ' (apparently
the original source of Section 5678) must be briefly considered
before the meaning of this section is finally determined.
Bennett v. Davis' involved the ability of an infant to em-
power an attorney to make a confession of judgment against
the infant. It is no authority for the proposition that an in-
fant cannot appoint an agent. There has always been a gen-
eral reluctance on the iart of the courts to enforce agreements
for the confessions of judgment even against adults. It is a
well-established rule that all agreements of an infant, by their
nature detrimental to him, are void."
A second case, Bool v. Mix," dealt with the ability of an
infant to be a grantor of real property. There was no issue of
' MECHEM. OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (3rd ed. 1923) §§165-182;
7 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. 1922) 182.
"Even If §5678 be interpreted as including the appointing of an agent
by an infant, it might not unreasonably be construed as simply declara-
tory of the general rule that such infant cannot absolutely bind him-
self by such appointment. In somewhat the same manner, courts often
talk about the acts of an Infant being void when it is clear that they
really, intended to declare such acts only voidable. 1 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) P. 677.
"See R. C. M. 1935, §10520, also notes 5 and 9, supra.
"FIELD CODE §15.
"(1826) 6 Cowin (N. Y.) 392.
"Askey v. Williams (1889) 74 Tex. 294, 11 S. W. 1101, 5 L. R. A. 176.
" (1837) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285.
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agency involved. The only reference to an infant's power to
appoint was in the following statement:
"The rule seems to be universal, that all deeds or in-
struments under seal, executed by an infant, are voidable
only, with the single exception of those which delegate a
naked authority; which are void."
Furthermore, the court cites approvingly the reluctance
of the Massachusetts case of Whitney v. Dutch" to countenance
any rule denying the capacity of an infant to appoint an agent.
The latter case, which is the third one given in the anno-
tations to the FiEL CoDE, states:
"Perhaps it can't be contended against the current of
authority, that an act done by another for an infant, which
act must necessarily be done by letter of attorney under
seal, is not absolutely void; although no satisfactory reason
can be assigned for such a position."
This case is not authority for the proposition that all appoint-
ments by an infant are void, but only as to instruments of
authority required to be under seal. Even as to these the
quotation is mere dictum. The court went on to hold that an
infant might appoint an agent to do an act which was to his
advantage, such act being voidable rather than void.
Thus considered, the exact rule that these cases were sup-
posed to reveal is not altogether clear. Suffice it, that they are
not very persuasive one way or the other as to the proper inter-
pretation of Section 5678.
If certain cases from other CoDe states were thought to
control the meaning of this section the conclusion that an in-
fant can appoint an agent in Montana would be hard to justify.
All such cases interpreting sections corresponding to our Sec-
tion 5678 are distinguishable however. California, Oklahoma
and Territory of Dakota (now the states of North and South
Dakota) have substantially this provision:
"A minor cannot give a delegation of power, nor make
any contract relating to real property, or any interest
therein, or to personal property not in his immediate pos-
session or control. " '
It should be noted at the outset that the Section in these
CoDEs differs substantially from Montana's, in that it explicitly
"(1817) 14 Mass. 457, 7 Am. Dec. 229.
"CAr Civ. CoDE (Kerr) 1921 §33; CoMP. STATS. Oim. (1931) §4976;
Coup. LAws, S. D. (1929) §81.
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denies that an infant has any capacity to contract with ref-
erence to certain transactions. This is vital to an adequate ex-
151anation of the pertinent cases because in each one the trans-
action involved came within one of the expressly prohibited
classes set forth.
Though no question of agency was involved,, the California
case of Hakes Investment Co. v. Ljo n declared in dictum that
it was the intent of their legislature to change the rule of an
earlier state decision" which had decided that an infant had
the power to convey real property and to do so through an
agent. The Lyons case involved a deed direct from infant to
grantee.
Carlisle v. National Oil Development Co.' and Wambole
v. Foot" are the only two cases which might be said actually to
construe the statutory provision: "A minor cannot give a dele-
gation of power." The cases involved conveyances of real
property by an infant through an agent. Although it may be
argued that they were decided under the first clause in the
statute, it is significant that neither of the courts even con-
sidered the effect of their CoDE sections similar to Section 7929.
Had they done so the result would have been unchanged be-
cause, under the provisions of their statute, an infant clearly
lacked the capacity to contract under the facts involved. Hence
these cases should not be considered as even persuasive in Mon-
tana where Sections 5678 and 7929 must be harmonized.
It has always been the policy of the law to allow an infant
to avail himself, if possible, of any benefit which is opportune.
If it is concluded from Section 5678 that an infant cannot ap-
point an agent for any purpose it will prevent him from taking
advantage of those transactions which are beneficial to him.
It makes it impossible for an infant to ratify the act after he
comes of age.'
"The better view appears to be that an infant's ap-
pointment of an agent or attorney, and the acts of the latter,
are not absolutely void, but are merely voidable, there be-
ing no distinction in this regard between an appointment
and other acts or contracts of an infant.' "
The Montana Supreme Court never has had to directly de-
cide the issue at hand. It is within the province of the court,
"(1913) 166 Cal. 557, 137 P. 911.
'Hastings v. Dollarhide (1864) 24 CaL 195.
(1921) 83 Okla. 217, 201 P. 377.
"(1879) 2 Dak. 1, 2 N. W. 239.
"31 A. L. R. 1001.
"031 A. L. . 1001, 1002.
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should the question come before it, to reach a decision compatible
with the better reasoned principles of modern authority. The
decisions of other CODE jurisdictions" may be easily dis-
tinguished as governed by provisions not in our CODE. In any
event they are not controlling and the question is left open to
the court."
-J. Chandice Ettien
CONFLICT OF LAWS: DOES R. C. M. 1935, SECTION
7537 REQUIRE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
"PLACE OF PERFORMANCE" GOVERNS
THE ESSENTIAL VALIDITY OF
A CONTRACT?
It is quite generally conceded that the weight of authority
throughout the United States is that where a contract is made
in one state either to be performed there or elsewhere the law
of the state where the contract was entered into governs its
validity; i. e., whether any legal rights or duties arise from the
contract against either party in favor of the other.' Surpris-
ingly enough the Montana Supreme Court has never as yet
"Supra, Notes 21, 23 and 24.
"In the event that the court does not see its way clear to accept the con-
clusions of this comment it is submitted that the Montana legislature
should repeal the statute. The rule, as apparently reached in the jur-
isdictions of Dakota and Oklahoma, has no foundation in reason.
Slight inquiry will show that it is contrary to the usual practice. Min-
ors often act through agents in the ordinary course of their transac-
tions.
It was suggested in 2 CALIF. L. Rav. 312 (1914) that Section 33
of the California Code (corresponding to §5678 of the Montana Code)
be amended to read: "A minor under the age of eighteen cannot di-
rectly or by a delegation of power make contracts relating to real
property or personal property not in his immediate possession. . ...
If such an amendment were enacted, the section would become merely
a limitation on the infant's personal capacity. Further, it would in-
volve difficulties of interpretation. What does the commentator mean
by the words "immediate possession"? Does he mean a present vested
interest or actual physical possession?
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §332, 2 BEALIF, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) §332.4, p. 1090, GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938)
§107, p. 273. Some writers disliking the generally prevailing rule cite
the result of Beale's 1910 survey which shows a plurality of states
favoring the rule that the place of performance governs the essential
validity of a contract. See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) p.
207.
2 Historically, at least, three possibilities have been recognized: First,
apply the law that the parties intend should apply; Second, apply the
law of the place of performance; Third, the accepted weight of
authority rule, apply the law of the place of contracting.
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